INTRODUCTION
Eavesdrop morning coffee at any major centre of evolutionary theory today, and you will find 'parasite' to be one of the commonest words in the language. Parasites are touted as prime movers in the evolution of sex, promising the final solution to that problem of problems, the puzzle that led G. C. Williams to proclaim in 1975 'a kind of crisis' at hand in evolutionary biology Tooby, 1982; Seger & Hamilton, 1988) . Parasites seem to offer a plausible justification for the otherwise futile effort females put into choosing among posturing males (Hamilton & Zuk, 1982 ; but see Read, 1990) . Frequency-dependent selection exerted by parasites is, according to one admittedly minority view, largely responsible for the high levels of diversity found in gene pools (Clarke, 1979) . One might even extrapolate to a time when the entire metazoan body could come to be seen as a gigantic adaptation against microscopic pathogens.
I want to use parasites in an entirely different kind of evolutionary argument, almost a philosophical argument. Parasites have a role in clarifying the very meaning of that most basic unit in the hierarchy of life, the organism itself (Dawkins, 1982 (Dawkins, , 1989 . Parasites help us to think straight about the problem that I shall call the 'Paradox of the Organism'. Much of the background to what I shall say is discussed at greater length, as part of a comprehensive vision of life, in my book The Extended Phenotype. I shall not bother with further detailed citations of this book.
To show the direction in which I am going, let me anticipate my answer to the question 'What is the organism?' It will turn out that an individual organism is an entity all of whose genes share the same stochastic expectations of the distant future. I shall begin by showing one thing that the organism is not, though it is usually thought to be, namely a unit of natural selection.
THE ORGANISM IS NOT AN 'OPTIMON 1 '
I have used the word 'optimon ' for that kind of unit in the hierarchy of life about which we may say: ' Such and such an adaptation is for the benefit of that unit.' For instance, a group selectionist might argue -wrongly -that the species is an optimon, meaning that there are adaptations that are for the good of the species. I have joined others in making the case that the optimon must be a self-replicating entity, and that therefore even the organism is not a true optimon. Genes, and to a lesser extent larger fragments of genomes, are true self-replicating entities. Organisms, even asexually reproducing organisms, are not. Examine the logic of modern natural selection theory in sexual populations and observe that it is all about changes in frequencies of copies of things. In practice these things are genes, in the sense of Mendelian units independently assorting in gene pools, but any self-replicating entity would do in principle. In the perspective of evolutionary time, the genes inhabit not a pool but a river, flowing through time, a broad-fronted turbulent river down which the Mendelian particles zig-zag their way, changing partners at every generation, some increasing in frequency, others decreasing. Successful genes are those that become more frequent, unsuccessful ones those that become less frequent. But individual organisms do not have a frequency at all, or rather each individual has a frequency of one. This is one reason why genes, but not organisms, can be optimons.
The other reason is more important, and it applies whether reproduction is sexual or asexual. It is that genes, but not organisms, form replicating lineages in which copying errors are passed in one direction along the lineage. Even in an asexual lineage of organisms, for instance a mother to daughter to grand-daughter lineage of asexually reproducing Daphnia, the organisms are not true replicas of the previous generation. T o be sure, they resemble the previous generation and may even be indistinguishable from the previous generation. But identity is not the same thing as heredity: heredity has causal directionality. Clonal organisms resemble each other in the same sense as 100 copies of a book run off the same printing press resemble each other. Maybe you can't distinguish one copy from another, but they have not derived their characteristics one from another. All have derived their characteristics from the same parent, the same printer's block. In order to simulate true heredity you would take one copy of the book and Xerox it. Then Xerox a copy of the copy, then a copy of that copy and so on. If you made 100 copies of a book by that method there would be a true hereditary succession among the copies: number 49 would be the daughter of number 48 and the mother of number 50, and so on.
The operational test of whether we have true heredity is to examine the fate of copying errors. In a lineage of Daphnia, blemishes to genomes are inherited by subsequent members of the lineage; blemishes to bodies -lost limbs, for instance -are not. In terms of the book analogy, what is passed from mother to daughter is not a body but the printer's block that made the body. Each body is independently run off a copy of the same printer's block, not run off any other body. Needless to say, this isn't a new point. I am simply reiterating the Weismannian dogma of the continuity of the germ line and the non-inheritance of acquired characteristics.
Organisms, then, are not replicators. So, what are they ? The answer is that they are vehicles for replicators, built by a cooperative of independently assorting replicators. As such, they are extremely impressive units of function, but they are, nevertheless, not replicators. The organism is not an optimon. We should strictly never say of an adaptation such as a wing or a behaviour pattern that it is for the benefit of the organism. Nevertheless, organisms are such coherent units of function that it is extremely tempting to see organisms as units that work to maximize something on behalf of all their genes. Their existence as cohesive units of function, in the teeth of potential conflict among the true replicators that they contain, constitutes a paradox which I shall call the Paradox of the Organism.
THE PARADOX OF THE ORGANISM
The paradox of the organism is that it is not torn apart by its conflicting replicators but stays together and works as a purposeful entity, apparently on behalf of all of them. Not only is it not torn apart; it functions as such a convincingly unified whole that biologists in general have not seen that there is a paradox at all! They have wrongly taken the organism for granted as the unit about which questions of adaptation should be asked.
It is possible to do the mathematics of natural selection completely forgetting that, as a matter of fact, the genes are not swishing about in a liquid pool or river but bound up in solid chunks -organisms -and colossal chunks at that. The gene inhabits two time-scales, two worlds, corresponding to its two roles. In its evolutionary role the gene inhabits eternity, or at least geological time. Its companions in the river of evolutionary time are other genes, and the fact that in any one generation they inhabit individual bodies can almost be forgotten.
But in its other role, its embryological role, the world of the gene seems bounded by the skin of a particular individual organism. Its companions are the other genes that happen to make up the genome of that organism. And it cooperates with those other genes to produce a huge -by gene standards -machine, bristling with apparently purposeful technical wizardry. To repeat, the paradox of the organism is the paradox that organisms are such marvels of cooperative engineering; yet the cooperating genetic replicators that build them, in their other role as denizens of deep time, would seem to have every reason not to cooperate, every reason to cheat on their temporary partners and steal a march down the next reach of the evolutionary river. Why is the organism not torn apart by the conflicting interests of the multitude of self-interested units that it contains ?
The potential for tearing apart is ever present. It is starkly demonstrated by the phenomenon of Meiotic Drive, and rather more subtly made manifest in the chain of reasoning that leads to the doctrine of the 'extended phenotype'. I shall take these in order.
MEIOTIC DRIVE
Meiotic drive is well known and I can be brief. In normal meiosis, each member of an allelic pair enjoys an equal chance of getting into each gamete. Meiosis is a biological process like any other, and it can come under genetic influence like any other. If a gene happens to arise whose phenotypic effect is to bias meiosis, so as to give itself more than the usual 50 % probability of getting into each gamete, that gene will tend to spread through the gene pool, even if, as is usually the case, its other effects are deleterious. The phenomenon really exists, and it is called meiotic drive. The best known meiotic drive gene is the Segregation Distorter gene in Drosophila (Ciow, 1979) . Now, one way of expressing the paradox of the organism is this. Why aren't all genes segregation distorters or worse? Why, instead, do most genes submit to the discipline of cooperating with one another in building a shared phenotype ? THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE I usually demonstrate the extended phenotype in easy stages, beginning with the demonstration that an animal artifact, like a bird's nest, is a phenotype like any other, under the control of the animal's genes in exactly the same sense as the shape of its beak is under the control of its genes. So, there can be genes 'for' nest shape, nest colour and so on, in exactly the same sense as there are genes 'for' tail length or eye colour. I then go on to parasites manipulating their hosts, and demonstrate that the modification to the host, whether it is morphological, physiological or behavioural, can be seen as phenotypic expression of the parasite's genes. The final stage in the argument, the idea of genetic ' action at a distance', again uses parasites, this time parasites such as cuckoos whose manipulation is achieved by remote control. By the same logic as before, the modification to the host's behaviour can be seen as phenotypic expression of the parasite's genes. The 'central theorem of the extended phenotype' (Dawkins, 1982) is this: An animal's phenotype tends to maximize the survival of the genes ' for' that phenotype, whether or not those genes happen to be in the body of the particular animal performing it.
Here I will leave out the artifacts and go straight to the parasites. The literature on parasites manipulating their hosts has been reviewed several times recently (Holmes & Bethel, 1972; Ewald, 1980; Dobson, 1988; Keymer & Read, 1990; Moore & Gotelli, 1990 ; the medical and epidemiological implications have been reviewed by Ewald, 1980) .
A typical and favourite example is the fluke Dicrocoelium dendriticum, whose ungulate definitive host needs to eat its ant intermediate host in order for the worm to complete its life-cycle. This aptly named ' brainworm' burrows into the suboesophageal ganglion of the ant and, significantly, the ant's behaviour changes. Infected ants climb to the top of grass stems at a time of day when normal ants would retreat underground. There they clamp their jaws in the stem and remain as if alseep, immobile and vulnerable to being grazed by ungulates. This story, like many others, has long been treated as a plausible case of parasites manipulating their hosts for their own advantage (Wickler, 1976; Love, 1980) . All that I am adding to this familiar point is that it must be the parasite's genes that are doing the manipulating and that, if you examine what it ever means to talk of genes as having phenotypic expression, it follows that the parasite's genes are having phenotypic expression in the host's body.
I shall return to this logical argument about parasite genes having extended phenotypic effects upon host bodies. Meanwhile I must concede that it depends upon the assumption that the host really is being manipulated for the benefit of the parasite: that the host's altered phenotype really is an adaptation for the benefit of the parasite. It isn't always easy to be sure whether a phenotype is an adaptation at all, or simply a byproduct, and the question of parasites affecting hosts is indeed one of the areas in which this is disputed. This topic needs a digression. It is also possible in some cases that the phenotype is an adaptation, not for the benefit of the parasite but for the benefit of the host in combating the parasite. I shall mention this at the end of the digression.
ADAPTATION OR BORING BYPRODUCT?
In many cases, undoubtedly, parasites benefit by their intermediate hosts's being devoured by their final host. Moreover, intermediate hosts are often, as a matter of fact, more likely to be eaten by final hosts if they contain a parasite than if they don't. It is tempting, therefore, to believe that this desirable outcome has been engineered by the parasite. But there is always an alternative, killjoy explanation, the 'boring byproduct' theory. Parasites are naturally expected to have a debilitating effect on hosts, and this obviously could make them less nimble in flight from predators. So the apparent adaptation could be merely a side-effect.
Even the boring byproduct theory allows the possibility that natural selection has, indeed, worked on parasites to increase the extent to which they make hosts feel ill, because of the benefit to the parasite. But we are going to be impressed only in those cases where the intermediate host is made to do something that we should not obviously expect tin the boring byproduct theory. As in the case of any scientific theory, its predictions impress us only to the extent that they are counterintuitive. It is not a theory's fault if its predictions happen to go along with common sense, but nevertheless it can't expect us to be impressed ! It is no use, moreover, multiplying up the number of different examples showing the same kind of thing, if all the examples predict the same commonsensical principle.
What evidence would impress us ? There are basically two kinds of effects on hosts that might persuade me that they are true parasitic adaptations. The first possibility is that, far from being made ill, the host might have some aspect of its life apparently improved by the parasite. (Of course it is important to stress 'some aspects' and 'apparently', otherwise we beg the whole question of whether the parasite is a parasite at all.) Thus, instead of being made smaller by a parasite, hosts are sometimes made larger. This is often true in those cases known as 'parasitic castration' (Reinhard, 1956; Baudoin, 1975; Moore & Gotelli, 1990) . And Noble & Noble's (1976) textbook describes the following case:
Some species of carpenter ants infected with metacercariae of the fluke Brachylecithutn mosquensis, are more obese than noninfected ants and, unlike the latter, they do not conceal themselves but crawl on exposed surfaces where they are easily found by birds that are the next hosts of the fluke. This behaviour seems to be a remarkable example of an animal that sacrifices its life for its parasites. The 'sacrifice', of course, is induced by the parasite.
Presumably the fluke benefits, not only by making the ants crawl in exposed locations where birds can see them, but also by making the ants fatter and more tempting targets for the birds. The economic resources used by the ants to grow larger are not, of course, provided by the parasite. The resources must be robbed from other uses in the ant colony to which they might have been put: perhaps larvae went hungry as the infected ants were induced to eat more and wax fat.
Turning to behaviour, sometimes parasites, far from making their hosts seedy and listless, seem to pep up their activity levels. Moore & Gotelli (1990) note that acanthocephalans often increase the activity levels of their intermediate hosts. An example of this that I have used before is from the work of Bethel and Holmes on the behaviour of gammarids infected with Polymorphus paradoxus and P. marilis (Holmes & Bethel, 1972; Bethel & Holmes, 1973 , 1977 . T h e two species of acanthocephalans are 'aiming' at different definitive hosts, and they appear to change the behaviour of their gammarid intermediate hosts, in opposite directions that increase their vulnerability to predation by their respective definitive hosts. In neither case does this change in behaviour include an impairment in the activity level of the gammarids.
The same is true of many examples of insect vectors of blood parasites changing their behaviour when infected. Thus tsetse flies infected by Trypanosoma probe more frequently and feed more voraciously than uninfected control flies (Jenni et al. 1980) . And bumblebee queens infected by the nematode Sphaerularia bombi 'flew almost incessantly, stopping to dig, then moving on. In the process, they deposited nematode larvae' (Moore & Gotelli, 1990) . Giles (1983) and Milinski (1985) reported that sticklebacks infected with the tapeworm Schistocephalus solidus were less fearful in the presence of predators than uninfected controls.
From our point of view, parasites that make hosts larger rather than smaller, or more active and less fearful, are interesting because it is harder to write the effect off as a boring byproduct. The same is true where the host is induced to do something unexpected by commonsense, something bizarre. One of my favourite illustrations concerns nematomorph larvae who need to break out of their insect hosts and return to water:
...a major difficulty in the parasite's life is the return to water. It is, therefore, of particular interest that the parasite appears to affect the behaviour of its hosts, and ' encourages' it to return to water. The mechanism by which this is achieved is obscure, but there are sufficient isolated reports to certify that the parasite does influence its hosts, and often suicidally for the host...One of the more dramatic reports describes an infected bee flying over a pool and, when about six feet over it, diving straight into the water. Immediately on impact the gordian worm burst out and swam into the water, the maimed bee being left to die (Croll, 1966) .
Much as I enjoy this anecdote, I can't help worrying about it. How was the observer (not identified in the book) able to see something so small as a gordian worm bursting out of a bee ?
The second type of case in which the boring byproduct theory seems less plausible is where the parasite achieves a detailed fit to some complicated aspect of its host's physiology, something too statistically improbable to have come about by chance. A beautiful example, quoted by Keymer & Read (1990) concerns a fungus called Monilinia vaccinii-corymbosi, the 'Mummy-Berry fungus', which infects blueberries and is economically quite important (Batra & Batra, 1985) . The fungus induces the blueberry plant to grow fake flowers. Insects visit these fake flowers, pick up the fungus's asexual reproductive conidia and transport them to real flowers. The conidia infect the host flowers and induce them to produce not normal blueberries but seedless, inedible 'mummy-berries'. The fungus overwinters in the mummy-berries. The fake flowers induced by the fungus are impressive in their detail, which is why I bring the example up here. They become reflective in ultraviolet light which is attractive to insects, make a smell, and secrete nectar. It seems hard to write off such a cluster of apparently specific adaptations as a boring side-effect of parasitic infection. The case for detailed parasite manipulation seems strong.
My favourite example along these lines is one reported by Fisher in 1963. As it happens, this is another case where the host is induced to become larger.
Tribolium larvae infected with Nosema sp. attain larger size than uninfected controls. Infected larvae undergo as many as six supernumerary molts and most commonly die as giant larvae, weighing two times as much as nonparasitized controls (Fisher, 1963 ).
Fisher went on to describe experiments on Blaberus cockroaches.
From these experiments it was concluded that the parasite Nosema produced a substance with juvenile hormone activity and sufficed to replace or augment that produced by the corpora allata of the host.
Cheng remarked in his textbook (1973):
If the situation in Tribolium is similar to that in Blaberus, and there is no reason to believe that it is not, then the enhanced growth in parasitized Tribolium can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to the contribution of a juvenile hormonelike material by Nosema.
Presumably a giant larva is a more bountiful source of food than an adult half its size. So, the parasite would seem to have something to gain by the manipulation. Now to the point that this example is making. The juvenile hormone molecule seems far too improbable a specific juxtaposition of atoms for a protozoan to hit upon as a boring, accidental byproduct of something else. The case seems strong that it has evolved as a specific adaptation to manipulate the physiology of the host.
Another example, though here the functional significance from the parasite's point of view is less clear, is the effect of the tapeworm Spirometra mansonoides on rats. Under experimental conditions an infected rat may grow to nearly eight times its normal weight. It seems to be due to the secretion, by the parasite, of a growth-hormone-like substance. Here it has been suggested that the tapeworm may have ' borrowed' a mammalian, even specifically human, gene and is using it to manufacture a mammalian hormone (Phares, 1987) . Whether this is so, or whether it has independently evolved the ability to synthesize the hormone, we can hardly write off the parasite's effect on the host as a boring, accidental side-effect.
But in any case, as Darwinians, the word accident should give us pause. Do not all adaptations start off as accidents, random mutations ? What is the difference between an accidental side-effect that happens to benefit the parasite (which I am calling a non-adaptation) and a favoured mutation (which I am calling an adaptation) ? The solution to this conundrum lies in the distinction between single step and cumulative selection (Dawkins, 1986) . A single step of natural selection cannot produce an adaptation sufficiently complex to impress us as being obviously an adaptation. All the undisputed adaptations, from the aerodynamics of a swift's wing to the acoustics of an owl's ear, impress us because they fit their purpose in many different respects which could not have come about in a single mutational step. They have evolved their efficiency cumulatively, in series, over many steps of accidental mutation followed by non-accidental selection. At least some alleged cases of parasites manipulating their hosts seem to meet the criterion: it really is hard to imagine that the synthesis of insect juvenile hormone by the protozoan Nosema is anything other than a highly specific Darwinian adaptation that must have taken many cumulative steps of natural selection to perfect.
The same seems to me true of some of the behavioural effects of symphylic caterpillars in ants' nests. Often they bristle, literally, with equipment for manipulating their protectors. The caterpillar of Thisbe irenea has a sound-producing organ in its head which apparently has no purpose other than summoning ants (De Vries, 1988) . Near the insect's rear end is a pair of telescopic spouts which exude seductive nectar. On its shoulders stand another pair of nozzles secreting not food but a volatile substance, which has a dramatic impact upon the ants' behaviour. An ant coming under the influence of this chemical leaps clear into the air. Its mandibles gape and it turns aggressive, far readier than usual to bite or sting any moving object except the caterpillar responsible for drugging it. Moreover, an ant under the sway of a manipulating caterpillar eventually enters a state called 'binding', in which it becomes inseparable from its caterpillar for a period of many days. Once again, the complex of elaborate organs in the caterpillar, and the complex of specific effects on the ant's behaviour, seem to leave no doubt that natural selection, for the benefit of the parasite, has been at work, cumulatively over many generations.
Before leaving the digression on boring byproducts as an alternative to parasitic adaptation, I must also deal with the third possibility, host adaptation. Raised temperature in response to infection is just the kind of effect that might tempt one to ingenious stories about parasites manipulating hosts. No doubt a feverish brain does all sorts of things that make its unfortunate possessor more likely to be eaten by predators, and in some cases this might benefit the parasite. There seems good reason to believe, however, that fever is an adaptation by hosts to create unfavourable conditions for parasites; see, for example, Boorstein & Ewald (1987) whose paper has the added attraction of including an experimental investigation of protozoan-induced fever in grasshoppers.
I must also mention that, since The Extended Phenotype was published, one of its main examples of parasite manipulation has been claimed to be a host adaptation. Snails are frequently induced by trematode parasites to grow larger, and specifically in some cases to develop thicker shells. Following the logic above, this seems temptingly to argue a strong case for parasite manipulation. A smaller snail, or a thinner shell, could have been put down to general debilitation, a boring side-effect. But a thicker shell must surely mean that something more interesting is going on. The parasite, I suggested, is selfishly prolonging the life of the individual snail in which it lives, at the expense of the snail's reproduction.
The theory makes use of the idea of an economic trade-off. From the snail's point of view, I suggested, there is an optimal shell thickness, a compromise between the protective benefits conferred by a thick shell and the economic savings in calcium and other resources conferred by a thin one. If snails would really benefit from thicker shells they would grow them without being prompted by flukes. I regarded the compromise as one between reproduction and individual survival. A thicker shell would favour survival of the individual snail but would exact economic costs that would reduce its reproductive success. The parasite has the same interest as the snail in the snail's survival, but it has no interest in the snail's reproducing itself. From the parasite's point of view the optimum shell thickness is shifted towards favouring individual snail survival at the expense of snail reproduction. Minchella (1985) , however, put forward an alternative theory. His paper discussed the phenomenon of parasite-induced gigantism and parasitic castration in general, and listed three hypotheses about it. Firstly, the boring byproduct theory:
The traditional view of gigantism has been that it is a sideeffect or non-adaptive consequence of parasite-induced cessation of reproduction ... The energy which was to be used for reproduction becomes available to the host for increased growth.
Secondly, he took the parasite adaptation theory, which he attributed to Baudoin (1975) and to me. He remarked that both these first two hypotheses regard the host as 'an unresponsive partner whose actions are dictated by the actions of the parasite'. He was sceptical and, as a third option, put forward his own theory. Gigantism, parasitic castration, and prolonged life at the expense of reproduction generally, are, Minchella suggested, adaptations on the part of the host. The host temporarily switches resources into fostering its own longevity, at the temporary expense of its reproduction, in an attempt to outlive the parasite and return to reproduce at a later date.
Minchella and three colleagues attempted to test between the three hypotheses, using the specific case of trematode effects upon snail shells . Rather surprisingly, since these results appeared in the same year as Minchella's hypothesis was published, they found against that very hypothesis : it turned out that the snails cannot outlive the parasites anyway. They concluded in favour of the parasite manipulation hypothesis of Baudoin and myself. This is gratifying, though I take passing exception to the label 'prudent parasite' that they attach to the parasite manipulation hypothesis. They say that it is equivalent to Slobodkin's (1961) 'prudent predator' theory. Slobodkin's theory notoriously was based on an uncritical group-selectionism that was egregious even by the standard of ecologists. Predators were supposed to restrain their hunting in the interests of conserving stocks for the future. This does not quite have to be group selectionist: we could assume that each individual predator has exclusive hunting rights over a geographical area, or in some other way secures privileged access to the benefits of its own prudence. But there was no indication that Slobodkin was aware of this need, and 'prudent predators' have rightly had a bad name among the Darwinian cognoscenti ever since.
The parasite manipulation hypothesis is also shored up by indirect evidence of its underlying economic assumption of trade-offs between snail shell thickness and reproductive rates. looked at 5 snail species coexisting in the Potomac river, Physa heterostropha, Bithynia tentaculata, Helisoma trivolvis, Mudalia carinata and Goniobasis virginica. She measured the ability of the shells of each of these species to withstand attacks by duck and crayfish predators, and correlated it with reproductive rate measured as the intrinsic rate of increase. She found a negative association across species between effectiveness of armour and reproductive rate. Although it is always risky to draw conclusions about trade-offs from across-species comparative studies (the 'other things being equal' assumptions are so fragile), her data are undeniably exactly what I should wish them to be. Her conclusion is aptly summed up in her title: ' Reproduction or shell armour -a trade-off in freshwater gastropods'.
For the purpose of developing my argument further, any example of parasite manipulation would serve. I'll use the snail shell thickness example on the assumption that it really is an authentic case of parasite manipulation. If you do not find this example plausible, simply substitute any case where you are prepared to accept that a parasite has evolved to manipulate a host's phenotype for the parasite's benefit.
EXTENDED GENETICS Let's assume, then, that flukes really are manipulating snails into growing larger shells, and translate the story into the language of the extended phenotype. Essentially, this means taking a gene's-eyeview.
Any Darwinian adaptation comes about through the non-random survival of genes in a gene pool. There must have been genetic variation in tendency to produce the adaptation of interest: some animals had it, others didn't, because of differences in their genes. The ones that had it were more successful, and so more copies of the relevant genes were passed into future gene pools. This process continued until the phenotypes associated with these genes became the norm. In this case, since it is a fluke adaptation we are talking about the genes are in the fluke gene pool. But the phenotypic effects that we are talking about are manifested in the snail's body. It is the snail's shell, not any part of the fluke's body, that is the phenotype of interest.
Of course the fluke genes work proximally via phenotypic effects on the fluke's body. But this does not nullify the conclusion that these fluke genes are also exerting phenotypic effects on the snail's body. Any conventionally recognized phenotypic effect of a gene is the end of a cascade of earlier embryological effects, in this case all within the same body. A gene ' for' waltzing behaviour in mice presumably begins, like most other functional genes, by influencing the synthesis of a protein. This affects something else which affects something else which, further down the causal cascade, distorts the embryonic development of the balance organs in the inner ear. This is the penultimate step in the cascade, and it leads to the 'ultimate', behavioural effect that we actually observe, namely waltzing behaviour.
But I p u t ' ultimate' in inverted commas advisedly. There is nothing to stop us recognizing any stage in the cascade as 'the' phenotypic effect of interest. Instead of assaying phenotype behaviourally, a geneticist could dissect the ears of specimens and study the genetics of abnormal inner ear anatomy. Or a biochemical geneticist could detect the abnormal protein product of the 'waltzing' gene, and use that as its phenotypic marker. Similarly, there is no necessary reason why waltzing behaviour should be regarded as the last step in the cascade. Waltzing mice might be especially vulnerable to predation by cats. The gene might therefore be labelled, not the 'waltzing gene' nor the 'abnormal inner ear gene' but the 'vulnerable to cats' gene. Which label we choose will depend upon which step in the cascade of causal effects seems to be the most salient in the life of the animal, or the most relevant to the interests of the geneticist.
Similarly, fluke genes must exert their effect on snail shells via a cascade of prior effects within the fluke body, but this does not prevent us from seeing the cascade as extending on outside the fluke's body. To say that fluke genes have phenotypic effects on snail bodies is to make exactly the same kind of logical extension as we are accustomed to making anyway. It is just a little startling because it is an unfamiliar idea. Nevertheless, the logical correctness of the principle is inescapable.
I imagine three geneticists examining the same data and analysing it in three ways. The first is a fluke geneticist. He observes that some flukes secrete a chemical and others do not. This chemical affects the physiology of the host snail, and induces it to build a thicker shell, diverting into this project resources that it would have preferred to use for other purposes such as reproduction. The fluke geneticist studies this phenotype in successive generations of flukes, and observes that it breeds true, or at least has a hereditary component. For the fluke geneticist, the snail is just part of the environment, like the pond in which it lives.
The second geneticist is a snail geneticist. He observes that some snails have thicker shells than others and he looks to see if the characteristic breeds true over generations of snails. He finds that it does not; or at least that there is also a substantial environmental component to the variation which he identifies as associated with the presence of flukes. As far as the snail geneticist is concerned, the flukes constitute environmental noise, comparable to the noise that might be introduced by differing calcium levels in the water of different ponds.
The third geneticist -and the one whose approach I commend -is an extended geneticist. She looks at variation in snail shell thickness down pedigrees of snails (with different flukes) and down pedigrees of flukes (in different snails). The phenotype that she is studying seems unambiguously a snail phenotype. But it turns out to vary under the influence of both fluke genes and snail genes. The two sources of genetic influence interact with one another in just the same kind of way as we conventionally see different genes from the same genome interacting with one another. Most phenotypes are influenced by a large number of interacting genes, often pushing in different directions. The final phenotype is a compromise between these shared genetic influences, and these interact too, with non-genetic 'environmental' influences.
In the present case the fluke geneticist admits complicated interactions and compromises among fluke genes, but consigns the snail genes to 'environmental noise'. The snail geneticist acknowledges complicated interactions and compromises among snail genes, but relegates the fluke genes to environmental noise. The extended geneticist achieves a more penetrating analysis. She sees interactions among fluke genes, interactions among snail genes, and interactions between fluke and snail genes, all bearing upon the same, shared phenotype. All these factors, of course, also interact with environmental variables. For the extended geneticist the category 'environmental noise' is smaller. It includes the calcium content of the pond but does not include the genes of the fluke or the genes of the snail. These have been taken out of the environmental residue, into the fold of genetically explained variation.
Later in her extended genetic analysis, the extended geneticist might investigate the possibility of hijacking even more sources of variation out of the category of 'environmental noise' and into the category of 'extended genetic influence'. Perhaps even the calcium content of the pond is under the genetic influence of some animal or plant, and natural selection is working on these genes because their phenotypic effects feed back and influence their own welfare.
There is, indeed, no obvious limit to the distance over which extended genetic influences may travel. A beaver dam is an undoubted adaptation. Exactly how it benefits beavers is not clearly understood, but it presumably has something to do with the lake that it creates. Part of the story is probably that the lake provides a secure and convenient route for transporting logs. Whatever the exact advantages, beaver lakes are certainly adaptive phenotypes that have evolved through the natural selection of beaver genes. There must have been genes 'for' lakes of various kinds, or natural selection would have had nothing to work on. Presumably there were genes for lake size, genes for lake shape, genes for lake depth, and so on. The fact that all these genes must have worked via influences on the building behaviour of beavers is irrelevant to the logical point being made. In just the same way as it is legitimate to speak of genes for beaver behaviour, even though this phenotype is a product of some prior effect, say on neuroanatomical wiring, so it is in principle legitimate to speak of genes for round lakes versus elongated lakes. The point of introducing beaver dams as extended phenotypes is that they can be very extended indeed -several square miles! Returning to parasites, some of the most striking examples of extended phenotypes are provided by the galls that plants are induced by insects to make. I have previously quoted Mayr on the subject because, as long ago as 1963 galls moved him to use language highly congenial to the extended phenotype thesis. A recent paper on the subject makes explicit use of extended phenotype terminology (Weis, Walton & Crego, 1988) :
The evolution of the plant-gall interaction is complicated by the fact that galls are phenotypic entities that develop under the influence of both plant and insect genotypes. From the plant's perspective, the gall is a developmental abnormality, induced by an environmental stimulus, i.e. the insect. When viewed from the insect's perspective, the gall is a phenotypic extension. Selection may act upon the insect to alter this extended phenotype, and thus gall formation is an adaptation of the insect.
Galls also provide an excellent example of an adaptation too complicated to be written off as a boring pathological byproduct:
Unlike microbe-induced plant tumours with their unstructured cell proliferation, insect galls are ' harmoniously organized entities with an orderly arrangement of cell layers and determinate growth which results in structures with particular size and shapes'. New, localized developmental gradients emanating from the gall maker take over plant cell differentiation. Concentric tissue layers, with nutritive and protective function, differentiate around the insect. The information for this developmental process undoubtedly lies in both the insect and plant genomes (Weis, Walton & Crego, 1988) .
Meiotic drive and the extended phenotype, then, from their different directions, serve to emphasize the dilemma that I am calling the paradox of the organism. The phenomenon of meiotic drive reminds us that the organism is a cooperative of entities that -one might have thought -would be constantly at civil war. It is a highly successful unit of pacification of fundamentally warring particles. How does it do it? Or, to phrase the question at the gene level where it should be phrased, why do the genes cooperate so spectacularly ? Why don't they all behave like segregation distorters ?
Meanwhile the doctrine of the extended phenotype reminds us that there is no necessary reason why organisms should exist in the first place. Genes survive in the gene pool by virtue of their phenotypic effects. But those phenotypic effects do not necessarily have to be bundled up into discrete organismal vehicles. The phenotypic effects by which a gene levers itself into future gene pools comprise all of that gene's effects on the world. It is only a contingent fact, not a necessary one, that so many phenotypic effects of genes are, as matter of fact, tied together in the gigantic and ingenious clusters that we call individual organisms. The paradox of the organism remains, and the time has finally come to show how parasites help us to solve it.
BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES
Thinking about parasites can help us to solve the paradox of the organism because parasites blur the practical dividing line between one organism and another, between themselves and their hosts. By examining this practical blurring between organisms we can sharpen up our theoretical perception of what it means to be an organism at all. Smith (1979) used the vivid simile of the Cheshire Cat's grin to dramatize the blurring of boundaries between parasite and host.
In non-living habitats, an organism either exists or it does not. In the cell habitat, an invading organism can progressively lose pieces of itself, slowly blending into the general background, its former existence betrayed only by some relic. Indeed, one is reminded of Alice in Wonderland's encounter with the Cheshire Cat. As she watched it, 'it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone'.
Smith was talking about intracellular symbionts, including putatively ancient ones such as mitochondria. Here the blurring is so complete that the historical separation of the parties may become all but undetectable. But there is a kind of blurring between parasite and host that can arise even though their tissues may not physically blend. There is a teleonomic blending -a blending of functional interests -which may or may not be accompanied by a blurring of physical boundaries.
OVERLAPPING AND NON-OVERLAPPING DESIDERATA LISTS
Think about the conflict of interest between a parasite's genes and the genes of its host, and note that the conflict is only partial. If you make a list of those outcomes in the future that would benefit the host's genes, and those that would benefit the parasite's genes, they diverge in many ways, but there is a partial overlap between them. Both sets of genes 'want' the host to go on living, at least for a while, because the host's body is the present vehicle for both sets of genes. But they may differ in how long they want it to go on living. The parasite's genes may require the host to be eaten by a definitive host, while the host's genes would prefer this not to happen. In such a case, selection on host genes is pushing the shared phenotype towards increasing longevity, while selection on parasite genes is pushing it towards decreasing longevity. In other cases, such as the snails discussed above, the host's genes may be selected to divert resources towards reproduction at the expense of survival, so tending to reduce longevity, while the parasite's genes are pushing it to survive longer at the expense of reproduction.
But those are details, specifics. My general point at the moment is that there is a partial overlap in interests between the two sets of genes. We could, in principle, make a list of events in the future that both sets of genes would 'want'. There will also, of course, be a list of events in the future that only the host genes want, and another list that only the parasite genes will want. Let us call these two the 'host desiderata list' and the 'parasite desiderata list', and we'll call the overlap between the two lists the 'shared desiderata list'. For completeness we should note that in theory the shared list includes future outcomes that we take for granted like the sun's continuing to shine, but we are specifically concerned with outcomes over which the genes can have some phenotypic influence. The doctrine of the extended phenotype has taught us not to ignore the parasite desiderata list where the host phenotype is concerned, for the parasite genes can have an influence over the shared phenotype just as the host genes can. Now, what kinds of factors will affect the size of the shared list in comparison to the other two lists ? I believe that it is possible to give a powerful general answer to this question. The answer is that parasite genes and host genes will agree on the same desiderata list to the extent that they use the same route into future generations. What are the routes of a gene into future generations ? Sperms, eggs, spores, runners, suckers, airborne capsules of DNA, whatever vehicles are used to transport DNA into the future, it is here that we must concentrate our measurement of overlap or divergence. Suppose a parasite reproduces by spores which it inserts into the eggs of its host, and the spores then grow up to form a new generation in the body of the host's child. In this case there will be a substantial overlap between the parasite and host desiderata lists. Both sets of genes want the host to reproduce successfully; both will probably agree on what is the desirable balance in the trade-off between longevity and reproduction; both will agree that the host should not be eaten by predators, should be sexually attractive, should build a good nest and be a good parent. Both sets of genes will probably agree on what is the best song for the host to sing, what is the best colour for its tail, and so on.
At the other extreme, consider a parasite that causes its host's body to burst, shedding parasite spores into the wind in a puff of dust. In this case the two desiderata lists will scarcely overlap at all.
Presumably both lists will mention keeping the host alive for a while, but the parasite list wants it alive only enough to build up a good bulk of spores. Thereafter the lists diverge markedly. The parasite genes care nothing for the reproduction of the host; they have no interest in making it sexually attractive, no interest in its proficiency as a nest-builder or as a parent.
Between these two extremes will be a spectrum of parasite/host relationships with varying overlaps of future interests. My point is that the key variable affecting the degree of overlap in interests is the extent to which the parasite and host share the same gametes (or spores, etc). Where parasite and host share gametes, the shared desiderata list will be relatively large, and the parasite will evolve to become benign. Where parasite reproduction is via an entirely separate channel from host reproduction, the shared desiderata list will be relatively short, and the parasite will be malignant.
My hypothetical parasite with spores travelling inside host eggs is not quite the most extreme along the spectrum towards benignness. The shared desiderata list here is undoubtedly large, but there could be a slight divergence of interests. Over the host's sex ratio, for instance. Host genes desire, according to Fisherian logic, equal investment in sons and daughters. Parasite genes, in this hypothetical example, have an interest in the host's successfully rearing daughters; but these genes have no interest in the host's rearing sons since they do not stand to be passed on in host sperms. These hypothetical parasite genes are in the same position as mammalian mitochondrial or cytoplasmic DNA (Eberhard, 1980; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Charnov, 1982) .
The largest possible shared desiderata list will be found in those cases where the parasite DNA not only shares gametes with host DNA but is actually spliced into the host chromosome.
And so we are led full circle, back to the paradox of the organism. The paradox can now be restated in terms of desiderata lists. We take it for granted that all the genes in the genome of an organism share the same desiderata list, but this is a contingent, not a necessary fact. Why does it so often turn out to be true? Why don't the separate genes, or subsets of them, go their separate ways with separate desiderata lists ? The solution to the paradox now almost states itself, so clear has the parasite spectrum made matters. An organism's own nuclear genes share the same desiderata list for exactly the same reason as parasite genes and host genes do when they share gametes. The important fact about an organism's own nuclear genes is that they all share the same gametes. It is for this reason, and this reason alone, that they stand to gain from the same set of outcomes in the future. It is for this reason alone that they all 'agree' over what is the optimum state of every aspect of the phenotype, all agree on the correct wing length, leg colour, clutch size, growth rate, and so on.
Those cases where nuclear genes don't share the same gametic expectations are precisely the cases where they 'rebel' and don't pull together with the rest -segregation distorters and their ilk. Even more rebellious would be nuclear genes that found a wholly non-gametic avenue into the future. Suppose that a human nuclear gene discovered the trick of splicing itself directly into chromosomes of another individual -a trick that is now known to be quite common in prokaryotic DNA. Now natural selection might favour such a gene if it mutated in such a way as to circumvent the orderly, communal, gametic route into the next generation and move sideways instead. It might, for instance, cause strategically placed cells to tickle the lining of the nose, inducing a sneeze. The speculation has to be completed, of course, by the assumption that the rebel DNA, blown out in a sneeze, is then breathed in by another human where it splices itself into the new victim's genome. Whether this example is wholly speculative, or whether viruses and their kind are in fact derived from rebellious host DNA does not matter too much. The example serves, in any case, to underline the central point: that the only thing that really binds all of an organism's 'own' genes in a common enterprise is the fact that they all share the same gametic route into the future.
Of course, sexual reproduction ensures that the genes of an organism share the same genetic route into the future only in a probabilistic sense. Every sperm or egg produced by an individual in normal sexual reproduction is unique, so the genes in the diploid genotype do not share future expectations in an absolute sense. But so long as meiosis is a fair lottery -and it looks significantly as though elaborate steps have been taken to ensure that it is -every gene in an individual's genome has the same stochastic expectations of the future. This is why they cooperate with one another, and this is the explanation of the definition of the organism with which I began: 'An individual organism is an entity all of whose genes share the same stochastic expectations of the distant future'.
By this definition, parasites and hosts whose stochastic future expectations were identical would evolve closer and closer together, with more and more blurred edges, until they would fuse and become the same individual. The reason why fluke tissue and snail tissue are still not fused is that their desiderata lists are not totally overlapping. It is not that there is something qualitatively fluky about one set of genes and something qualitatively snaily about the other set. Either of both sets of genes could have been put together, originally, by fusion of earlier symbiotic unions. What keeps snails and flukes apart in evolution is their divergent future interests, and this is because they do not share reproductive propagules. What keeps host genes together with host genes -and parasite genes together with parasite genes -is that they do share future interests. Parasites, then, have led us to the solution to the paradox of the organism. The genes in an organism share desiderata lists. And this is simply because they submit to the same meiotic lottery and possess the same stochastic gametic destiny.
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